Abstract Heterogenous banking supervision and regulation is often considered as the most important impediment for Pan-European Bank mergers. In this paper we identify other more fundamental reasons for a limited degree of cross-country integration in retail banking. We argue that the distribution of regional liquidity shocks may pose a natural limit to the extent of cross-border bank mergers. The paper derives the impact of different underlying stochastic structures on the optimal structure of cross regional bank mergers. Imposing a symmetry restriction on the underlying stochastic structure of liquidity shocks we find that benefits from diversification and the costs of contagion may be optimally traded off if banks from some but not from all regions merge. Under an additional monotonicity assumption full integration is only desirable if the number of regions with diverse risks is sufficiently large.
Introduction
The integration of the European banking sector has so far mainly been limited to the wholesale market. The lack of pan-European banks however is the major obstacle to an integration of the retail bank market. It is often argued that large cross-country mergers of banks have mainly been impeded by the heterogenous banking regulation and supervision in the European union. 1 This paper questions whether indeed the heterogeneity in the regulatory and supervisory regimes in Europe is the only reason why cross-country bank mergers in the European Union have been limited and have failed to create a truly pan-European bank. A banking system that relies on international institutions provides an insurance mechanism against national liquidity shocks. However, cross border transactions and mergers can bring about a risk of financial contagion, i.e. they may increase systemic risk. A liquidity shortage in a single region can spill-over to other regions if large financial institutions are fully liable for their foreign branches.
We develop a model of banks as managers of different liquidity risks related to Kashyap et al. (2002) . However, unlike Kashyap et al. (2002) we follow Allen and Gale (2000) and assume regional liquidity shocks as the primary source of banks' liquidity risk. Banks can choose to operate in different regions. Banks offer regional households with uncertain intertemporal consumption preferences a liquidity insurance through deposit contracts as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) . However, in each region there is some risk associated with the fraction of depositors having early consumption needs. A bank that operates in more than one region can insure depositors against regional liquidity risks. However, it risks that liquidity shortages in other regions spill over and adversely affect its entire business. Using this framework we show that a partial integration of the retail banking sector with banks operating in several but not all regions may actually be optimal given a certain fundamental stochastic structure of regional specific liquidity shocks.
Obviously, any system of cross regional financial integration can be supported by some underlying stochastic structure of liquidity needs. In order to gain further insights one needs to distinguish more and less realistic scenarios. In our paper we impose a symmetry assumption which excludes positive or negative correlations of shocks across regions. We show that even if all regions are entirely symmetric and no particular correlation between the liquidity
